Is political fragmentation (i.e. nation states) more favorable to economic growth than political unification (i.e. a united empire)? This paper develops a simple endogenous-growth model to analyze the conditions under which economic growth is higher under political fragmentation than under political unification. Under political unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan taxation and possibly subject to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations. Under political fragmentation, the competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense. If and only if capital is sufficiently mobile, then political fragmentation would favor economic growth. When the political regime is chosen by the rulers, they do not always choose the growth-maximizing regime. In particular, there exists a range of parameter values, in which political fragmentation is more favorable to growth but the rulers prefer political unification.
Introduction
Is political fragmentation (i.e. nation states) more favorable to economic growth than political unification (i.e. a united empire)? A number of economic historians, such as North (1981) and Jones (1981) , argue that the unique European nation-state system contributed to its economic takeoff in the late 18 th and early 19 th century while the united-empire system in China was responsible for its economic stagnation during that period. 1 For example, North (1981) suggests that the interstate competition arising from political fragmentation induces the competing rulers to recognize private property rights in order to prevent labor and capital outflows, and the resulting economic system with secured property rights creates the proper environment for capital accumulation and hence sustained growth. However, Bernolz and Vaubel (2004) note that political fragmentation did not always lead to these predicted effects.
"Political fragmentation is not a sufficient condition for political competition, innovation and growth… Political fragmentation will not lead to interstate competition unless there is considerable mobility among jurisdictions… Political fragmentation will not favour innovation and growth if it leads to prolonged and highly destructive wars rather than limited warfare or peaceful competition for manpower and capital." Bernolz and Vaubel (2004, p. 14) So, under what conditions would fragmentation be more favorable to growth than unification? Also, when the political regime is chosen by the rulers, do they have the incentives to choose the regime that is more
favorable to growth?
To analyze the growth effects of fragmentation versus unification, this paper develops a simple endogenous-growth model characterized by three parameters indexing (a) the degree of capital mobility, (b) the extent of competition in military defense and (c) the heterogeneity costs or the benefits of unification under a unified country. We analyze how these three factors affect the households' capital investment rate and the rulers' tax rate, which in turn determine the equilibrium growth rate, under the two political regimes. We follow Karayalcin (2008) to use the tax rate to capture both legal and extra-legal property expropriations by rulers. This formulation of using taxation as a measure of property rights is also consistent with Drazen's (2000, p. 459) obersvation that "… property rights can be considered in the narrow sense as applying to taxation of property: even in the absence of the threat of outright expropriation, societies can nonetheless legally expropriate the fruits of accumulation via taxation."
Within this framework, we have the following findings. On one hand, political fragmentation can be advantageous to growth because the competition between rulers limits their ability in taxing households. The extent of this limitation is governed by the degree of capital mobility, which in turn is determined by a mobility cost. This mobility cost is meant to capture North's (1981) idea that the monopoly power of a ruler depends on the cost of exit for the citizens. On the other hand, political fragmentation can be damaging to growth if the competing rulers allocate an excessive amount of productive resources to military defense. As for the case of political unification, the unified country may have (a) a higher level of aggregate productivity due to economies of scales and lower trade barrier or (b)
lower productivity due to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations into a single nation. We will consider both possibilities. Allowing for the possibility of these heterogeneity costs enables the model to capture some of the important insights from the country-formation literature. For example, Spolaore (2003, 2005) argue that there are additional costs in ruling heterogeneous populations under a single nation. Potential sources of these costs include conflicting preferences over public policies, coordination costs, monitoring costs, and the expected losses associated with civil wars.
In summary, under political unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan taxation and subject to the heterogeneity costs or unification benefits. Under political fragmentation, the competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense. The theoretical analysis suggests that whether fragmentation or unification is more favorable to growth depends on the degree of capital mobility. If and only if the degree of capital mobility is higher (lower) than a critical threshold, then fragmentation (unification) would favor economic growth, and this critical threshold is increasing in the degree of defense competition and decreasing in the heterogeneity costs (or increasing in the unification benefits).
When the political regime is chosen by the rulers, they do not necessarily choose the growthmaximizing regime. In particular, there exists a range of values for the heterogeneity costs (or the unification benefits), in which fragmentation is more favorable to growth but the rulers prefer unification.
On one hand, when the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high (or the unification benefits are sufficiently low), economic growth is higher under fragmentation that exhibits tax competition. On the other hand, the rulers suffer from consuming a lower level of tax revenue under fragmentation due to competition in both taxation and defense. When the heterogeneity costs are not excessively high (or the unification benefits are not excessively low), this negative level effect dominates the positive growth effect under fragmentation, and the rulers enjoy a higher level of utility under unification. In this case, although fragmentation favors growth, the rulers prefer unification. In contrast, the households always prefer the regime that favors growth. Therefore, there is a range of values for the heterogeneity costs (or the unification benefits) in which the households and the rulers have conflicting preferences, and this range of parameter values is expanding in the degree of (a) defense competition, (b) capital mobility and (c) Leviathan (i.e. the weight that the rulers place on taxation relative to households' welfare).
Related Literatures
This paper relates to a number of literatures (a) institutional economics and economic history, (b) endogenous-growth theory, (c) Leviathan and tax competition, (d) country formation and (e) the political economy of growth. This paper formalizes some important insights from a number of economic historians on the effects of political fragmentation on growth using an AK endogenous-growth model. In particular, it embeds a framework of Leviathan taxation into the growth model to analyze the conditions under which capital mobility would constrain the tax rate chosen by self-interested rulers and enhance growth under fragmentation. 2 Furthermore, it borrows some of the insights from the literature on country formation to analyze the different growth effects of fragmentation and unification. Alesina and Spolaore (2005) analyze how the heterogeneity costs and the cost of international conflict affect the size and the number of nations. 3 In contrast, the current paper firstly analyzes how these factors affect economic growth for a given size and number of nations. Then, it considers whether the political regime that is more favorable to growth would be chosen by the rulers.
Drazen (2000, ch. 11), Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 14) and Acemoglu (2008, ch. 22 and 23) provide excellent surveys on the political economy of growth. Chaudhry and Garner (2006) The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and results.
The final section concludes with a brief discussion on the first unification of China in 221 BC.
The Model
There is a continuum of identical households residing in each of the two symmetric regions. In the case of political unification, the unified country is ruled by a group of political elites, who choose the tax rate and consume the tax revenue to maximize their utility that is a weighted average of the tax revenue and households' welfare. Taking the tax rate as given, the households choose consumption and investment to maximize their utility. Due to constant returns to scale in capital in the production function, the output growth rate is determined by the investment rate and the tax rate.
In the case of political fragmentation, each of the two regions is ruled by a group of political elites, who make an additional decision on defense spending for the purpose of capturing a larger share of land. The households also have to make an additional decision on the allocation of capital. When the households allocate a fraction of their capital to the other region, they face a mobility cost. This mobility cost determines capital mobility and affects the equilibrium tax rate chosen by the political elites. As the degree of capital mobility increases, the political elites reduce the tax rate due to tax competition.
Households
There is a unit-continuum of identical households residing in each region ∈ j {home, foreign}, and their lifetime utility is
(1) At each instant of time, the households use their accumulated capital t K to produce goods, and they decide how much to consume and invest in capital by maximizing utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by indexes the degree of capital mobility across regions. When m equals zero, the mobility cost goes to infinity and capital is de facto immobile. As m approaches infinity, the mobility cost goes to zero and capital is perfectly mobile. As we will show later, other things being equal, an increase in m reduces the equilibrium t τ . Therefore, the parameter m can also be viewed as an index measuring the degree of tax competition.
Political Elites
There is a group of political elites in each region. Under political unification, the two groups of elites cooperate and rule the two regions as a unified country. Under political fragmentation, each group rules its region as an independent nation. The elites' lifetime utility is (4)
is the elites' discount rate. t R is the amount of tax revenue extracted and expended by the elites for their own consumption. The parameter ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ l indexes the degree of Leviathan. As l approaches zero, the elites become completely benevolent. As l approaches one, the elites become completely self-interested. This degree of Leviathan reflects the extent of the rulers' accountability. The higher the accountability, the lower the l should be. Similar political preferences have been utilized by Edwards and Keen (1996) , Rauscher (1998) and Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) . Also, (4) assumes that the elites have the same preference as the households on the amount of land captured by their nation. ). Taking the path of t τ as given, the households choose the control path of t c to maximize (1) subject to (2). Taking the households' best response as given, the elites choose the control path of t τ to maximize (4) subject to (2).
9 It is well known that this Ramsey approach typically suffers from the so-called "time inconsistent" problem (i.e. after households make their best response, the elites have the incentives to deviate from their chosen policies ex post).
Time inconsistency does not occur in our model given the pair of utility and production functions. Proof: See Appendix A.□ 9 Technically, we are solving a Stackelberg differential game, in which the elities (the leader) choose the policy first and then households (followers) choose their control path. Appendix A shows that the equilibrium is time consistent and subgame perfect. See, for example, Dockner et al (2000) , Xie (1997) and Karp and Lee (2003) for a discussion. 10 Xie (1997) 12 The equilibrium under political fragmentation is denoted with a superscript f. 11 We follow Alesina and Spolaore (2005) to use this tractable functional form, which originates from the literature on conflict resolution; see, for example, Hirshleifer (1991) . 12 Technically, we are solving a simultaneous-move differential game between the two groups of elites, and we focus on strongly symmetric strategies, in which the groups of elites take the same action both on and off the equilibrium path. This assumption is only for the purpose of ensuring that the equilibrium is subgame perfect among the set of off-equilibrium (symmetric) trajectories. In other words, the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium should , 13 each group of political elites have an incentive to undercut its own capital tax rate to prevent capital outflow and attract capital inflow. Therefore, higher capital mobility generates stronger tax competition and drives down the equilibrium tax rate under fragmentation. From (9) and (11), we see that as δ increases, the elites levy a higher tax rate and allocate more tax revenue to defense spending. Therefore, δ can be viewed as an index measuring the degree of defense competition.
Also, note that
and hence defense spending is wasted resources.
Growth Effects of Political Fragmentation vs. Political Unification
The condition that determines whether economic growth is higher under fragmentation or unification is
be understood as strongly symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a discussion on strongly symmetric equilibrium. 13 This rule will be derived in Appendix A.
In other words, fragmentation dominates unification in growth if and only if capital mobility is sufficiently high. The critical threshold m is decreasing in h and increasing in δ . As the heterogeneity costs increase (or the unification benefits decrease), the degree of capital mobility can be lower while fragmentation still delivers a higher growth rate than unification. As the degree of defense competition δ increases, the tax rate under fragmentation goes up. Therefore, a larger δ requires a higher degree of capital mobility in order to maintain a higher growth rate than unification.
Proposition 1: If and only if the degree of capital mobility is above (below) a threshold, fragmentation dominates (is dominated by) unification in growth. This threshold is decreasing in heterogeneity costs (or increasing in unification benefits) and increasing in the degree of defense competition.
Proof: Compare (7) and (12). Also, see (13).□
The Elites' Preferred Regime
Suppose the political regime is chosen by the political elites. Then, which regime would they prefer? In particular, we want to derive the conditions under which the elites prefer the regime that is less favorable to growth. Because the simple growth model does not exhibit transition dynamics, the lifetime utility of the elites can be simplified to 
reflects the elites' utility loss from consuming a lower level of tax revenue due to competition in capital taxation and defense spending. Capital mobility constrains the tax rate and results into a negative effect on the elites' utility through a reduction in the initial level of tax revenue. Similarly, defense competition causes the elites to divert a fraction of tax revenue to defense spending and hence lowers their tax consumption. As a result of these negative level effects, the emperors may have a lower level of utility under fragmentation even when this political regime is more favorable to growth. Proposition 2 and Figure 2 
Proof: Comparing (7) and (12) shows that
. Also, using (6), (10) and (14) shows that
Intuitively, when the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high (or the unification benefits are sufficiently low) such that h h > , which can be negative, the equilibrium growth rate is higher under fragmentation than under unification. However, due to the competition in taxation and defense spending, the elites suffer from consuming a lower initial level of tax revenue under fragmentation. When the heterogeneity costs are not excessively high (or the unification benefits are not excessively low) such that h h < , this As for the households, they always prefer the political regime that is more favorable to growth.
To see this result, their lifetime utility can be re-expressed as expands as l , β , δ or m increases. As the degree of Leviathan increases, the elites place a larger relative weight on their own consumption of tax revenue, so that they care more about the level of tax revenue than growth. Similarly, as the elites become more impatient, they once again value less the benefit of higher growth. As the degree of defense or tax competition increases, the initial level of the elites' tax consumption decreases; therefore, they would prefer unification unless the heterogeneity costs are excessively high. Corollary 1 summarizes this finding. The main results are as follows. Under political unification, the heterogeneity costs (unification benefits) have a negative (positive) effect on growth. Under political fragmentation, the interstate competition in defense spending has a negative effect on the economy while capital mobility that reduces the tax rate chosen by the elites has a positive effect. Although the abstract model may have neglected other important characteristics of each political regime, 14 whether fragmentation or unification is more favorable to growth should be partly determined by the relative magnitude of the above three factors.
Furthermore, when the political regime is chosen by the elites, they do not necessarily choose the growthmaximizing regime.
This finding potentially explains why so many ancient civilizations, except for Europe, adopted the united-empire system while the nation-state system might have been more favorable to growth.
Perhaps the heterogeneity costs in Europe due to its cultural and language diversity were higher than, for example, in ancient China such that the European rulers prefer political fragmentation while the Chinese rulers prefer political unification despite the possibility that political fragmentation would have been more favorable to growth and preferred by the citizens.
Finally, let me conclude this paper with a brief discussion on the first unification of China in 221
BC. Upon conquering the other nations and ending the Era of Warring States (from the 5th century BC to 221 BC), Qin Shi Huang (sometimes referred to as the first emperor of a unified China) standardized the Chinese units of measurements, the currency, the length of the axles of carts, the legal system, and most importantly, the Chinese script. These policies reduced heterogeneity across regions and were meant to improve the political elites' ability in ruling the unified China. An implication from the current study is that this reduction in heterogeneity costs led to a tendency of political unification in subsequent Chinese
Dynasties. This tendency of political unification resulted into less political competition that could have stimulated China's economic growth.
Integrating (A6) with respect to time yields
, and the transversality condition implies that the integration constant Ω must equal zero. Therefore, we have
is independent of the elites' actions and has a predetermined value. In other words, the initial value of the households' co-state variable (which may become a state variable in the elites' control problem) is predetermined. As a result, the households' best response does not create any incentive for the elites to deviate along the equilibrium path (i.e. the Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent); see Xie (1997) and Karp and Lee (2003) .
Combining (A2) and (A7) yields (5) Because the equilibrium paths are stationary and independent of the state variable, the equilibrium is subgame perfect (i.e. the households have no incentive to deviate at any time t and for any realization of the state variable); see Dockner et al (2000) . Finally, the second-order conditions are satisfied because (a) the control sets are convex, (b) the instantaneous utility function in (1) is strictly concave in t K , and (c) the law of motion for t K is linear in t K ; see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) . Because the elites' control path is stationary and independent of the state variable, it is sub-game perfect.
Also, the second-order conditions are satisfied as before. Finally, substituting (A15) into (A12) yields 
